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In early 1928, two events focused national media attention on the 
provincial Queensland city of Bundaberg. One was euphoric. Bundaberg-
raised aviator, Bert Hinkler, had flown the first solo transit from England 
to Australia and, on 27 February, triumphantly landed his biplane at North 
Bundaberg. Hinkler’s feat was a timely distraction to a community tragedy. 
Four weeks earlier, on Saturday 
28 January, the sugar city was 
awash with rumours about 
deceased and dying children. 
Within 48 hours, the Bundaberg 
Daily News and Mail confirmed 
what was already common 
knowledge. Over the weekend, 
12 children had died following 
inoculation against diphtheria. 
Another five were seriously ill 
in hospital. The calamity became 
a part of Australian medical 
history that still attracts inter-
mittent mention in the scientific 
literature. However, the mishap 
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has received surprisingly 
little interest from historians. 
Accordingly, this paper revisits 
a momentous day in Bundaberg: 
Friday 27 January 1928.
The background
The era was one when 
diphtheria was a common, 
serious and notifiable disease. 
The public appreciated its 
communicability and the 
special vulnerability of young 
children. Family and school-
teachers often recognised early 
symptoms and did not hesitate 
to make a provisional diagnosis 
of either croup or diphtheria. 
Moreover, the School Medical 
Service within the Queensland 
Department of Public Instruction 
complied with the Diphtheria 
Regulations, which involved 
swabbing programs that detected 
carriers. Afflicted individuals generally sought treatment, if for no other 
reason than family or peer pressure. Suspected carriers were often 
quarantined either in home, hospital or in the case of an epidemic, in 
temporary camps. Emergency treatment for acute symptoms was dramatic 
and often involved tracheal intubation; and (after 1935) tracheostomy 
(surgical perforation to the airway). An outbreak in London in 1921 cost 
that city’s ratepayers ‘about £500 000’.1 In 1927-28 Queensland figures 
revealed 1859 cases and 70 deaths, with the former number being a 15 
percent fall from the previous year.2 Clearly in the 1920s, diphtheria was a 
major public health problem.
Although the Commissioner for Public Health and the federally funded 
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories had recommended immunisation in 
1921 and although there was no direct cost to the recipient, it took five 
years for two Queensland local authorities to implement the measure.3 
While this evidence insinuates a reluctance to immunise, it needs to 
be emphasised that outbreaks were generally episodic and localised. 
Moreover, preventive strategies involving public health education had 
resulted in some success.4 This background explained why municipal 
Bert Hinkler, 1920s.
(Picture Queensland Collection, State 
Library of Queensland)
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reaction to diphtheria outbreaks was often impromptu and regional. In 
contrast, the Federal Treasurer, Dr E Page, used the national picture to 
justify immunisation: ‘Of the 125 000 children born in Australia each year, 
500 die of diphtheria before they pass school age’.5 However, Bundaberg’s 
regional councils appreciated the threat of diphtheria because in 1926, the 
disease had infected 130 Bundaberg and district people and had caused 
three deaths.6 Another 89 cases were reported in 1927. The fiscal impost to 
Queensland’s local government was significant because it subsidised public 
hospitalisation and, in the case of the Bundaberg City Council, provided 
quarantine facilities at the Bundaberg Showgrounds. Discharge was not 
allowed until three negative swabs had been recorded, which could take 
up to seven weeks to procure. Official estimates are vague but Godwin 
confirmed a direct cost to Bundaberg City Council for 1926 and 1927 of 
‘several thousand pounds’.7 Moreover in early 1928, Queensland’s major 
local authority, the Brisbane City Council, had recommended the regimen 
and a well-publicised United States study had revealed not only a growing 
acceptance of toxin-antitoxin immunisation but also a reduced mortality 
rate from 22.7 to 7.9 per 100 000 in immunised communities.8 Within this 
context, immunisation against diphtheria was innovative but not experi-
Child being immunized against diphtheria in the 1920s.
(Picture Queensland Collection, State Library of Queensland)
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mental. The measure made social, fiscal and medical sense and the Joint 
Health Board involving Bundaberg City, Woongarra Shire and Gooburrum 
Shire Councils, recommended immunisation for susceptible Bundaberg 
children. For all intensive purposes, it appeared to be a routine decision. 
Against this background, Bundaberg’s Medical Officer of Health, Dr EG 
Thomson, sanctioned immunisation with a public assurance of ‘positively 
no danger and no deleterious effects’.9
What happened?
Newspaper reports confirm that many parents welcomed the opportunity 
to have their children immunised. Dr Thomson started the inoculations 
on 17 January, 1928, which protocol involved three weekly administra-
tions. Treatment continued uneventfully on 20, 21 and 24 January. By the 
last date, six children had been injected with their second vaccination. 
On Friday 27 January, 13 children received primary injections while 
eight children received their secondary inoculations. Within 24 hours 18 
became ill. Eleven died during that time and another on the following day. 
Many died within hours of their admission to hospital. Their ages ranged 
from 23 months to seven years. The details of their deaths are recorded 
within the public domain and, suffice to say, many were not placid.10 
The programme included the doctor’s son, who survived, and those of an 
alderman, Councillor CO Baker, whose two sons were immunised, both 
of whom died. Like Thomson, Baker had strongly endorsed immunisa-
tion ‘at the Council table’.11 Another family lost three children and another 
interred its two daughters while their two bothers lay seriously ill in 
hospital. The Medical Journal of Australia later editorialised, ‘the subject 
is of immense importance to the whole community and particularly to the 
medical profession’.12 This was an understatement as demonstrated by 
a poignant editorial in the Bundaberg Daily News and Mail. The editor 
wrote: ‘Parents…have trusted their doctors and their civic authorities 
and they have been innocently penalised…The public will demand an 
investigation of the most searching kind’.13 Within 24 hours of the initial 
newspaper reports, the expressions of grief were accompanied by demands 
for answers. However accountability was a complex domain.
The significance of the legislative precincts
The enduring and fragmented divisions in Australian health legislation 
and administration meant that responsibility for diphtheria treatment was 
obscure.14 While health is a State responsibility the federal government 
has powers under the Constitution of human quarantine for international 
travellers via State-based Commonwealth Directors of Health. Under the 
Quarantine Act 1908 (Cwlth), federal powers in dealing with communi-
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cable diseases were largely restricted to Australian non-endemic diseases 
like smallpox, plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus and leprosy but 
‘state health departments were responsible for outbreaks of quarantinable 
diseases within their respective areas’.15 Although the medical quarantine 
service became incorporated into the Commonwealth Department of 
Health in 1921, diphtheria was a communicable disease in a legislative 
nexus that embraced local authorities. The Queensland Health Act 1900 
determined that local government had to provide hospital facilities 
for infectious patients if the State Commissioner for Public Health so 
ordered.16 Hence an international boat-traveller who was a ‘carrier’ could 
trigger a regional epidemic and the State government could transfer costs 
of treatment to the local authority. However, in the Bundaberg incident, 
the use of the toxin-antitoxin inoculant firmly implicated the federal 
government. Not only had the Commonwealth Government, the Common-
wealth Department of Health and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories 
[CSL] recommended immunisation, but also the last had manufactured 
30 bottles of toxin-antitoxin, known as Batch 86, one bottle of which 
was used in the Bundaberg inoculations. Moreover, the Commonwealth 
Department of Health had distributed some bottles of Batch 86 to a State 
supplier, Medical and Surgical Requisites Limited. Furthermore, the State 
government, Bundaberg’s Medical Officer of Health and the Joint Regional 
Health Board had endorsed immunisation against diphtheria, which was 
usually administered by the aforesaid medical officer at a room provided 
in the Bundaberg City Council’s Chambers. Hence although the legislative 
milieu for diphtheria prevention and 
treatment was ambiguous, and by default a 
local authority responsibility, this incident 
embraced the three tiers of government and 
carried connotations beyond Bundaberg.
The immediate medical reaction
This sudden loss of young life was 
without local precedent. On Saturday 
afternoon, at an unspecified time after the 
first six deaths, the Medical Superintendent 
of the Bundaberg General Hospital, Dr I 
Hains, telegrammed the Home Secretary 
requesting the services of a pathologist 
‘by special train or aeroplane’.17 Hains 
later informed the President of the 
Hospital, Bundaberg’s Mayor (1927-1936), 
Alderman B McLean and the Senior 
Bundaberg Base Hospital 
in 1924: Opened by the 
Governor of Queensland in 
1914, a small cottage hospital 
was previously on this site 
from the 1880s.
(Picture Queensland 
Collection, State Library of 
Queensland)
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Sergeant of Bundaberg Police 
of the deaths and intimated 
that he was not prepared to 
sign death certificates. These 
were a requirement to initiate 
internment proceedings. That 
afternoon Alderman McLean 
took possession of the bottle 
of remaining serum and in 
the evening Dr Thomson sent 
dispatches by rail to the Federal 
Quarantine Officer, Dr John 
Elkington, and Queensland’s 
Commissioner for Public Health, 
Dr JI Moore. The Maryborough 
Inspector of Police ordered the 
Government Medical Officer, 
Dr EG Schmidt, to perform 
post-mortem examinations. The 
Inspector of Police appreciated 
Schmidt’s ‘heavy responsibility’ 
and suggested that ‘the services 
of a pathologist be procured’.18
At this juncture, it is prudent 
to emphasise that the actions of 
the local medical profession-
als should be interpreted within 
the confines of contemporane-
ous knowledge and the extraordinary circumstances. Hains and Schmidt 
had appealed for expert assistance but both faced urgent and grave 
situations. Hains explained his predicament, that ‘there were so many 
dying’ and other children were seriously ill.19 Although not in the official 
reports, Schmidt faced other problems: inadequate mortuary facilities 
and a concurrent heat wave in Bundaberg. Schmidt began the autopsies 
and continued throughout that evening and the next morning. He certified 
death from ‘acute toxaemia’ following injection of toxin and antitoxin 
mixture. At interview, he commented that the exact cause of toxaemia was 
a matter of surmise at that stage.20 The Bundaberg Daily News and Mail 
reported Dr Schmidt’s comments under the caption of ‘Blood poisoned!’, 
which terminology caused some discontent between the medical fraternity 
and the newspaper.21 However the reality was that the Bundaberg General 
Hospital and St. Vincent’s Hospital were confronted with multiple 
Dr John Simeon Colebrook Elkington 
1871-1955. An advocate of public health, 
amongst his achievements were the 
introduction of a system for checking the 
health of school children, development 
of a federal quarantine service and work 
with tropical medicine.
(Picture Queensland Collection, State 
Library of Queensland)
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paediatric emergencies: 12 fatalities, many of which occurred within six 
hours of admission; no immediate specialist assistance; and mortuary 
facilities and protocols that were inadequate for authoritatively handling 
an emergency of this nature. There was no pathologist until Dr Richards 
of the Commonwealth Health Laboratory in Rockhampton arrived by mail 
train on Monday 30 January 1928. The Director of Tropical Hygiene, Dr 
JA Murray, also arrived the same day but his role was not clinical but for 
administrative inquiry. Dr Richards’ only autopsy was on a cadaver of 
over 52 hours ‘during which time at the temperature of Bundaberg much 
post-mortem change must necessarily have occurred’. Moreover, Schmidt 
and Richards were isolated and lacked experience in this type of forensic 
analysis. This background and the contemporaneous difficulties with travel 
and communication explained later observations that ‘many important 
possibilities which required immediate investigation were overlooked’.22
Knowledgeable medical opinion quickly emerged and agreed that the 
serum manufacture and immunisation per se were not the problems. 
Although not a medical practitioner, the experienced Public Analyst to the 
Bundaberg City Council, Mr J Christensen, made a prophetic statement, 
which the Brisbane Courier published on Tuesday 31 January.23 He alluded 
to the bulk buying of the serum and its prolonged usage. He highlighted: 
the use of a multi-dose bottle; repeated puncturing of the rubber cover; 
blood-derived serum being a potential culture medium; and time for 
bacterial incubation with the multi-dose vial. Defending CSL, the serum 
and the science that produced it, Christensen advocated individual doses by 
commenting: ‘We have economised by buying serum in bulk but we have 
spent dearly in precious lives’. The same edition of the Brisbane Courier 
carried the Commonwealth Director-General of Health, Dr Cumpston’s 
strong assertion that the serum was of good quality when the Department 
issued it.
The Brisbane City Council and the British Medical Society of Australia 
(after 1959 the Australian Medical Association) dispatched Dr HW Tilling 
who arrived from Brisbane on the same day. Tilling made unspecified 
investigations that the commissioners later revealed were ‘of consider-
able value’.24 The Federal Minister for Health, Sir Neville Howse VC, 
directed the Federal Treasurer, the Hon. Dr (later Sir) Earle Page, to 
Bundaberg. Page arrived by rail from Sydney on the following day and not 
only strongly defended the principle of immunisation but also advocated 
its continuance.25 Hence by the following Wednesday, Christensen, 
Cumpston, Elkington and Page had publicly acknowledged that prior 
inoculations from the same bottle had been uneventful and deduced that 
the ‘serum itself had been quite all right up to that stage’.26 Moreover, in 
268
other published interviews, medical practitioners from local authorities 
at Rockhampton, Ipswich and Wondai in Queensland and in New South 
Wales and Victoria, who had also used Batch 86, confirmed that their 
programmes had been uneventful. While many of the aforementioned 
authorities expressed caution in attempting to ascertain what had actually 
happened, newspaper reports reveal an early medical consensus suggesting 
something untoward had happened to the serum either in dispatch or while 
in Bundaberg. Suspicions centred on the possibility of serological change 
or a problem with the inoculating protocol.
The immediate political and social reactions
Although the initial scientific debate involved some speculation, 
political reaction was swift. Immunisation programmes were immediately 
suspended in Queensland and the Premier, Mr William McCormack (ALP, 
1923-1929) wired Alderman McLean and advised: ‘Shocked to learn of 
appalling loss of life in your city. Please convey to parents Government’s 
and my personal sympathy in their sad bereavement’.27 However it was 
the federal government that assumed control. Batch 86 was recalled. Like 
the CSL, the Commonwealth Department of Health defended the product 
and its status on dispatch from Melbourne. That being said, a former CSL 
director, Dr WJ Penfold, stated that it was inappropriate for the Laboratory 
to investigate its own product.28 On the Tuesday, the day of the last 
Bundaberg funeral, the Federal Ministry invoked a Royal Commission with 
three medical experts: Dr CH Kellaway (Eliza Hall Institute); Professor 
P MacCallum (University of Melbourne); and Dr AH Tebbutt (University 
of Sydney). These appointments excluded the CSL from formal represen-
tation on the Royal Commission. The Prime Minister, the Hon. S Bruce 
(Nationalist Party, 1923-1929) further enhanced the Royal Commission’s 
role by stating that inquiries would be ‘speedy’ and with an ‘entirely free 
hand’ and ‘show no secrecy’.29 Bruce’s delegation of the Bundaberg visit 
to his coalition partner, Dr Earle Page and not the federal Minister for 
Health, was also astute. While Page’s scientific expertise was not of the 
Bundaberg Daily News and Mail, 2 February 1928, p. 5.
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same calibre as the appointed commissioners, he was very familiar with 
diphtheria and immunisation and, with some justification, was portrayed 
in the media as a medical expert. Hence, the swift announcement of an 
imminent Royal Commission, its open terms of reference and Page’s visit, 
engendered scientific and political confidence.
With respect to the immediate social impact of the tragedy on Bundaberg, 
photographs and the journalists’ reports still told a story: closed businesses; 
flags at half-mast; hourly funeral processions; internments that extended 
into the evening; crowded footpaths with solemn observers; the mayor and 
aldermen as pallbearers; choirs and bands influenced by repeated perfor-
mances; three small coffins into one grave; and 2000 at the railway station 
to dispatch two coffins to Stanthorpe. The Brisbane Courier reports that 
‘Bundaberg never passed through such a grief-stricken day’30 and the 
Bundaberg Daily News and Mail labelled the ‘loss of twelve fine little 
children’ as ‘Bundaberg’s Gethsemane’. The latter paper added that the 
investigation of causes was Bundaberg’s ‘next duty’.31 It editorialised:
Immunization may do all that its advocates claim for it…Nevertheless 
however effective the serum may be, it is a filthy business based on a filthy 
foundation—that of injecting a disease-founded foreign body into the good 
clean blood of a healthy person…Advocates of inoculation, inventors and 
makers of serum, Ministers and officers of Health Departments have rushed 
to the defence of their laboratory baby…but Bundaberg will require more 
than that. Feeling ‘had’ by those it trusted in the immunization campaign, 
and with twelve child graves to keep it bitter, it will not be content with an 
academic controversy on sera among medical men…Twelve new graves in 
one day is argument enough for Bundaberg that something practicable has 
to be found. It is Bundaberg that has paid for this dreadful professional or 
departmental mistake, and the fact that it was an innocent or departmental 
mistake, does not lessen the payment extracted.32
As would be expected, the Bundaberg Daily News and Mail carried 
speculation as to what happened. Claims involved: dust contamina-
tion; the wrong serum had been used; the rubber top on the bottle was 
defective; effects of the heat wave; anaphylaxis (acute allergic reaction); 
blood poisoning; tetanus; and horse-related disease from manufacture.33 In 
spite of the aforementioned Prime Ministerial assurances, the editor and 
some of the public demanded an open inquiry.34 For example, a New South 
Wales’ correspondent submitted: ‘This tragedy must be probed to the very 
depths and the blame sheeted home to the person or persons responsible...’. 
Furthermore, the Bundaberg Branch of the Australian Labor Party [ALP] 
‘wired’ the Bundaberg parliamentarian, Mr G Barber (ALP, 1901-1935), 
calling for state intervention via two Queensland judicial appointees to the 
Royal Commission.35 The action was futile and the rationale is unknown but 
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plausible explanations involved 
the abovementioned editorial, 
rumour or misgiving based on 
political differences between 
the Australian Labor Party and 
the Nationalist-Country federal 
government. While assessment 
of the Bundaberg Branch’s 
motivation involves hypothesis, 
this evidence suggests that 
anger, suspicion and culpability 
were augmenting the initial 
expressions of grief. It was in the 
interest of all parties to institute 
swift action and the hearings of 
the Royal Commission began on 
Monday 13 February 1928. In 
just under a fortnight after the 
last internment, the commission-
ers were in Bundaberg taking 
evidence.
The royal commission
After three days of hearings 
at Bundaberg, the commission 
relocated for further sittings 
at Brisbane, Melbourne, 
Stanthorpe, Sydney and Toowoomba. In all, 36 witnesses appeared, which 
included three in New South Wales and 15 in Victoria.36 Howse tabled 
The Fatalities at Bundaberg – Report of the Royal Commission (costing 
£4954) in the House of Representatives on 13 June 1928. Moreover, 
the commissioners, while acknowledging inadequacies in post-mortem 
procedure, were at pains to stress, ‘the medical men at Bundaberg appear 
to have done all that was possible in the circumstances’.37 The cause of 
the tragedy was specific. The commissioners concluded that all evidence 
pointed to the injection of living Staphylococci bacteria as the cause of the 
fatalities. However the matter of responsibility was far more complex. To 
avoid problems with low temperatures interfering with the inoculant (as 
had happened in 1924 in Massachusetts), the toxin-antitoxin mixture was 
made without antiseptic and initially stored in sealed glass ampoules to 
avoid reuse.38 This was inconvenient in large immunisation programmes 
and rubber capped containers were introduced in late 1927. At that time, 
George Phillip Barber was born in 
1863 in England. He was the M.L.A. for 
Bundaberg from 1901 to May 1935. He 
died on 7 November 1938 in Brisbane. 
Barber was also president of the 
Queensland Rugby League, 1918.
(Picture Queensland Collection, State 
Library of Queensland)
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Batch 86 was an emergency order of rubber capped bottles and had been 
issued in two lots. Because labels had not been printed, the first issue did 
not include warnings about the absence of an antiseptic and did not specify 
that its use had to be immediate. To further confuse matters, only some 
practitioners were advised accordingly; and typed notices were attached 
to some packages only applied by a rubber band. Dr Morgan, the Director 
of the Laboratories Division of the Commonwealth Department of Health 
wrote to Elkington to advise that the second issue of Batch 86 did not have 
this warning, but the correspondence contained ambiguity and Elkington, 
with apparent justification, implied that future deliveries would contain 
the notice. As a precaution, Elkington advised distributors of Batch 86 to 
circularise those identified as recipients by reference to relevant December 
accounts. Two suppliers received the advice, but Medical and Surgical 
Requisites Ltd, who supplied Dr Thomson, did not.39 Therefore the 
calamity was partly due to a breakdown in communication.
While important as a contributing factor, this background did not explain 
the source of the contamination with the ‘Bundaberg Staphylococcus’, 
which was found in cultures from survivors’ wounds and in the remnants 
of the inoculant. Two possibilities emerged. One was that Dr Thomson’s 
fingers contacted the water which was used to remove the methylated 
spirits from the ‘sterilised’ needles. Another explanation was that the 
aspiration of the inoculant allowed ambient air in through the rubber cap 
via the puncture points. On available evidence, authoritative resolution of 
these matters was not possible. The findings were significant not only for 
the involved parties but also for the future of this public health measure. 
In abridged form, the commissioners concluded: the inoculations were 
responsible for the deaths and the illnesses; the toxin-antitoxin mixture 
was properly prepared and issued in a sterile form; the toxin-antitoxin 
mixture contained no antiseptic and was issued without instructions, which 
Bundaberg Daily News and Mail, 15 February 1928, p. 2.
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was an unsound procedure; and the prior injections from the multi-use, 
rubber-capped bottle had contaminated the serum with a pathogenic 
Staphylococcus.40
The legacy of this tragedy was immediate and lasting changes to 
Australian immunisation protocol followed. The potential for biological 
products to incubate or store pathogenic organisms carried new ramifi-
cations for bottling, capping, storage, labelling and use. Rubber capped 
containers were not to be repeatedly employed unless antiseptics were 
present. Where antiseptics were not included, the bottle and packaging 
were to be conspicuously labelled as such and residual product was to be 
immediately discarded after use. Where possible, bottles were to be of 
clear glass to facilitate examination for turbidity. To lessen the chances 
of a diphtheria outbreak, the more stringent Diphtheria Regulations 1929 
(Qld) were gazetted to include ‘suspected patients’, and the School Medical 
Service in the Department of Public Instruction swabbed ‘7,920 scholars 
attending 46 schools throughout the state’.41 Little appeared in the annual 
reports and medical histories, which was partially understandable because 
this episode was technically a cross-infection incident and not a threat 
to the principle of immunisation per se.42 Moreover, medical authorities 
were aware of a potential threat to immunisation per se as demonstrated 
by an editorial in The Medical Journal of Australia reminding the medical 
profession that it ‘had a duty at this period of reassuring the public’.43 
However while the scientific basis behind immunisation had been 
vindicated and endorsed by the medical establishment and the Brisbane 
Courier, these scientific findings were distinct and separate from the soci-
ological impact on Bundaberg and district.
Sociological impact
Newspapers carried graphic reports of the tragedy, the sociological 
impact of which continues to be largely unknown. Primary evidence was 
sparse because data on public opinion and associated operational variables 
was nonexistent. Retrospective sociological analysis must rely on tabloid 
reports and testimony in The Fatalities at Bundaberg – Report of the Royal 
Commission, which was reproduced in The Medical Journal of Austra-
lia. Scrutiny of both sources presents obvious confounding factors. The 
latter was a medical and not a behavioural inquiry. Its terms of reference 
meant that it was a sanitised source of information about community 
reaction. The experience of an immunised survivor, the now late Frank 
Baker, demonstrated the vagaries of reporting. In 1928, the Bundaberg 
Daily News and Mail reported that Baker ‘suffered no ill effects (beyond 
an abscess)’.44 In contrast, the Bundaberg News-Mail, with some authority, 
reported in 2002: ‘Bundaberg man Frank Baker never fully recovered from 
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a tragedy that claimed 
the lives of 12 of the 
city’s children early 
last century’.45 Hence 
retrospective scrutiny 
of the societal impact 
of the tragedy must in-
volve some conjecture.
Having made these 
concessions, evidence 
from Bundaberg con-
firmed that many resi-
dents now saw immu-
nisation as an emotion-
al and vexatious issue. 
Grief turned to suspi-
cion and raised issues 
of culpability. The Bundaberg Daily News and Mail published details of 
evidence, including some of the post-mortem procedures. Episodic 
discontent manifested itself on the second day of the Bundaberg 
hearings. The editor of Bundaberg Daily News and Mail decried the first day’s 
proceedings in that they only ‘elicited and confirmed and re-confirmed 
that which Bundaberg knows too well – that twelve of its children are 
dead from toxaemia’. The paper took the position that the inquiry should 
provide answers ‘if popular dread of immunisation is to be allayed and 
another disaster averted’.46 Criticising the absence on the Commission 
of a lay advocate, who would seek ‘information the people desire’, the 
paper offered itself as the ‘public’s mouthpiece’ and published a list of 18 
questions to which it wanted answers. While the Bundaberg Daily 
News and Mail focused on important issues like the conditions of sale, 
presence or absence of an antiseptic, instructions for use, emergency treat-
ment and the health prospects of the survivors, its first four questions 
inquired as to ‘who failed?’47 Moreover, after referring to the serum as 
‘this deadly substance’, the paper highlighted the difference of witnesses’ 
opinion over the role of the vial’s rubber cap, and then asked: ‘… are all 
right, all wrong or does it go by majority vote?’ Clearly, at the hearings 
in Bundaberg, culpability was now an element in unquantified commu-
nity dissatisfaction with the Royal Commission. Of course, this was not 
the role of the Commission, which was created to establish the cause of 
the tragedy. Later parliamentary debates confirm that a parliamentarian 
had been approached for ‘compensation’.48 Whether the Commission’s 
lucid findings on aetiology satisfied the local community and the editor 
Town view of Bundaberg, c. 1930.
(API-100-0001-0003 National Library of Australia)
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of the Bundaberg Daily News and Mail is a moot point. The question of 
responsibility was obscure because it implicated: inadequate labelling; 
communication break down; Dr Thomson’s injection protocol; ambient air 
contamination; and the purchase of bulk serum. There was no evidence 
relating to civil action. In a cautious editorial that highlights ‘the need 
for the most scrupulous care on the part of doctors and laboratories’, the 
Brisbane Courier asserts that ‘Our children must be protected ... the 
medical profession is practically agreed on the value of immunisation’. 
Hence, the principle of immunisation itself had been exonerated.
It would be naïve to suggest that there were no sociological sequelae. 
The Bundaberg City Council did not conduct diphtheria campaigns until 
after World War II. Twenty years later, during 1948 and 1949, some parents 
continued to spurn the campaign. While there is conflicting evidence 
about the extent of the sociological impact, a council employee from 1945 
to 1992, T Healy, succinctly commented: ‘the memory lingers’.49 Healy 
cited the mid-1950s as the era of restored confidence. The absence of 
behavioural investigation means that potential explanations must involve 
supposition. While time and faded memories were plausible reasons, there 
were other considerations: the 1954 resurgence of polio with the imminent 
prospect of the Salk vaccine; the emergence of triple antigen; community 
concerns about tuberculosis infectivity; and the Queensland Health 
Education Council’s campaigns.50 While the Bundaberg Branch of the 
Australian Vaccination Network demonstrates that pockets of opposition to 
immunisation remain in Bundaberg, evidence suggests its underlying 
philosophies represent libertarianism and alternative health regimens.51 
Indeed the very success of immunisation could be another factor in that 
the high prevalence and severity of symptoms of the various ‘childhood’ 
epidemics seems a distant memory. Having said that, tangible affirmation 
of Healy’s reference to lingering memories episodically surfaces. A 
Bundaberg News-Mail interview with an affected relative cites a ‘botched 
vaccination program’ and implicates aetiological factors like the ‘purchase 
price of the serum’ and the ‘cost of injection’.52 To some of Bundaberg’s 
senior residents, the 1928 incident is not forgotten. Furthermore, the 
noticeable and common occurrence of a small scar on the throat of 
Bundaberg’s senior citizens is testament to a generation that preferred the 
risk of diphtheria, quarantine and tracheostomy rather than of immunisa-
tion.
The positive
As often happens, out of human despair comes scientific advance. 
Commissioner Kellaway was a director of the Walter and Eliza Hall 
Institute of Medical Research where Dr (later Sir) Frank Macfarlane 
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Burnet, as an assistant director, had recently returned from London with 
a Doctorate of Philosophy in bacteriology.53 Kellaway recognised Burnet’s 
potential ‘in the advancement of world science’ and ‘deputed Burnet to 
conduct the necessary laboratory investigations’ for the Commission.54 
The Bundaberg tragedy impacted on Burnet, who was emerging as a 
prolific and eminent researcher who ‘found himself taking a more serious 
approach to antibody production.’ Burnet quickly isolated Staphylococcus 
aureus in both the administered toxin-antitoxin mixture and from pus from 
survivors. However Burnet was fascinated by the apparent metamorphosis 
of common skin bacteria into virulent pathogens and the survival of some 
inoculated victims.55 Ensuing investigations gave Burnet an insight into the 
importance of the role of the host body and its susceptibility to infectious 
disease and provided an example of the way a relatively harmless bacterium 
could be responsible for fatal infections.56 Burnet published findings on 
staphylococcal toxins and antibody response, which later evolved into the 
‘clonal selection theory’.57 The latter related to the nature and kinetics 
of primary and secondary antibody responses, and according to author, 
Ian Mackay, this interest opened Burnet’s ‘road to Stockholm,’ where he 
was awarded the 1960 Nobel Prize in Medicine for his work on immune 
tolerance.58 Hence, the Bundaberg incident had indirectly contributed to 
the evolving field of immunology, which would impact heavily on the 
medical sciences, for the benefit of the world.
One unanswered question relates to the fate of Dr Thomson, who 
continued to reside in Bundaberg for several years. Not without supporters, 
rumour has it that he personally struggled with events. After his departure 
from Bundaberg, Dr Thomson disappeared into the mists of time. The 
Commonwealth Government offered £100 to parents and guardians of 
the deceased and paid the ‘medical, nursing and other expenses’ of the 
surviving children.59 Perhaps the concluding observation is best left to Mr 
and Mrs CO Baker’s inscription on the Stanthorpe gravestone of their two 
sons Edward and Keith: ‘Thy purpose Lord we cannot see – But all is well 
that’s done by thee’.60
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